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Abstract
This paper investigates the potential for a causal relationship between certain supply-
side policies and UK output and productivity growth between 1970 and 2009. We
outline an open economy DSGE model of the UK in which productivity growth is
determined by the tax and regulatory environment faced by firms. This model is esti-
mated and tested using simulation-based econometric methods (indirect inference).
Using Monte Carlo methods we investigate the power of the test as we apply it,
allowing the construction of uncertainty bounds for the structural parameter estimates
and hence for the quantitative implications of policy reform in the estimated model.
We also test and confirm the model’s identification, thus ensuring that the direction
of causality is unambiguously from policy to productivity. The results offer robust
empirical evidence that temporary changes in policies underpinning the business
environment can have sizeable effects on economic growth over the medium term.
Keywords Taxation · Regulation · Labour market regulation · Economic growth ·
DSGE · Indirect inference
JEL Classiﬁcation E02 · O4 · O43 · O5
1 Introduction
In this study, simulation-based econometric methods are used to investigate whether
certain supply-side policies – specifically tax and regulatory policies – affected eco-
nomic growth in recent UK history (1970-2009). This period saw major reform to
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the UK’s institutions: marginal tax rates were reduced and the regulative system
was altered, notably including hiring and firing restrictions and union laws. The
stated objective of these so-called ‘supply-side’ reforms was to reduce barriers to
entrepreneurial innovation and so affect the macroeconomy via the production func-
tion. The episode has attracted great interest from academics and policymakers alike
as a case study of what supply-side policy can or cannot achieve, and continues to do
so. The UK government’s Plan for Growth (HM Treasury 2011) emphasized the busi-
ness start-up and operation channel, to be targeted by reducing “burdens” from tax
and regulation, in particular employment regulation.1 No UK government since has
signalled a movement away from this strategy; alongside its protective role, regula-
tory policy is viewed as a barrier to entrepreneurship and hence to growth.2 The area
has become heavily politicised, but there are empirical questions here which deserve
examination and this is what we set out to do in this paper.
We take a DSGE model of the (highly open) UK economy in which supply-side
policy affects incentives to set up innovative business ventures at the microfounda-
tional level, and so plays a causal role in aggregate productivity behaviour over the
short- to medium-run. The model is estimated and tested using Indirect Inference
methods (Le et al. 2011). Two recent surveys of this testing method published in this
journal (Le et al. 2016; Meenagh et al. 2019) set out how its power exceeds the tra-
ditional data-likelihood method. It also has low estimation bias in small samples. In
this paper, we present the results of our own Monte Carlo exercise into the power of
this test as we have applied it. We also apply a test of identification (Le et al. 2017) to
the DSGE model, complete with its unambiguous relationship from policy to produc-
tivity growth, finding that it is indeed identified. With this assured, the result of the
Indirect Inference test offers empirical support (or a lack of it, should the model be
rejected) for the specified growth policy mechanism. Furthermore, the results of the
power exercise imply uncertainty bounds for the structural parameter estimates we
obtain and for the quantitative results of policy reform exercises conducted with the
estimated model. The work is therefore complementary to existing empirical work
on the macroeconomic effects of structural reforms, as there is no question about the
exogeneity of policy in the identified model, and the conclusions rest on an estimated
structural model that is formally evaluated by classical econometric methods.
We find that this model in which temporary supply-side policy shocks gener-
ate long-lasting productivity growth episodes is not rejected for the UK 1970-2009
sample with the estimated parameter set. Using the estimated model, a one-off 1
1The “overarching ambitions” are: 1) “to create the most competitive tax system in the G20”; 2) “to make
the UK one of the best places in Europe to start, finance and grow a business” (p.5); 3) to stimulate invest-
ment and exports; 4) to “create a more educated workforce that is the most flexible in Europe”. Human
capital accumulation is notably last on this list and even then, the fourth point conflates two workforce
objectives: skill accumulation and labour market flexibility. This last is to be achieved by ensuring the UK
has the “Lowest burdens from employment regulation in the EU”, while the business environment is to be
improved by achieving “A lower domestic regulatory burden,” amongst other policies (p.6).
2The OECD characterises regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship. See e.g. OECD (2015), Figure 25,
a graph entitled “There is scope to reduce barriers to entrepreneurship” plotting UK Product Market
Regulation (PMR) scores against the average ‘best’ five OECD countries in terms of freedom from PMR.
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percentage point reduction in tax and regulatory policy leads in simulation to an
average higher growth rate of 0.09 percentage points per annum over 70 quarters.
The paper is structured as follows. A brief discussion of related work is pro-
vided in Section 2; the structural model is described in Section 3; Section 4 presents
the empirical work, including discussion of data, methods and robustness checks; a
policy reform experiment is given in Sections 5 and 6 concludes.
2 RelatedWork
Numerous models exist of how innovation raises productivity, and how policy can
enter that process. In New Endogenous Growth theory, spillovers drive a wedge
between private and social returns to innovation (Aghion and Howitt 1992; Romer
1990); such models recommend subsidies to research, while lowering barriers to
entry (such as regulation and tax) has an ambiguous effect on innovation (Aghion
and Howitt 2006; Acemoglu 2008). Related empirical work generally uses formal
R&D expenditure and patent counts to proxy innovation (e.g. Jaumotte and Pain
2005) but since formal R&D is dominated by large established firms, this overlooks
innovation by small and/or new businesses. Acs et al. (2009) refocus the growth
driver on entrepreneurs:3 entrepreneurship is decreasing in regulatory and admin-
istrative burdens and government “barriers to entrepreneurship” including labour
market rigidities, taxes and bureaucratic constraints. In Braunerhjelm et al. (2010),
the distribution of resources between R&D and entrepreneurship is as important to
growth as purposeful R&D investments (cf. Michelacci 2003). The implication is that
“Policy makers would be seriously misguided in focusing exclusively on knowledge
creation” (Acs and Sanders 2013, p. 787) while ignoring the effective commerciali-
sation of knowledge by entrepreneurs. This is a key factor in our modelling choices
(on which we say more below); we allow for tax and regulatory policies to affect
incentives to profit-motivated innovative activities that may include formal R&D but
are not limited to it.
Empirical work on structural policy-growth relationships falls roughly into three
categories: aggregate growth regressions (e.g. Erken et al. 2008; Acs et al. 2012;
Djankov et al. 2006; Djankov et al. 2010), simulated reform exercises using calibrated
DSGE models, and microeconometric studies on policy’s role in firm- or industry-
level panels (see e.g. Scarpetta et al. 2002 and Myles 2009). Studies in the first cat-
egory have serious difficulty establishing causality while the third category, though
often more successful at addressing identification issues than macro-regressions, can-
not reveal the macroeconomic impacts of policy. This motivates our DSGE-based
approach, and we discuss the second category here.
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) derive a New Keynesian DSGE model in which
product and labour market regulation affect the number of firms, employment and
the real wage. Everaert and Schule (2008) and Gomes et al. (2011) use similar cal-
3In their model, investment in R&D by incumbent firms yields intratemporal spillovers which generate
entrepreneurial opportunities
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ibrated models to analyse the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms in EU
countries. Regulatory reforms are treated as reductions in price and wage mark-ups in
labour and product markets which lower product and labour market slack, stimulating
employment and investment. Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) add search and match-
ing frictions, allowing hiring and firing costs to be modelled in a less reduced-form
fashion.
Coenen et al. (2008) use a calibrated two-country DSGE model (a version of
the New Area-Wide Model) to investigate the macroeconomic effects of reforms to
labour-market distorting tax rates, following the reasoning of Prescott (2004) that
higher tax wedges in the euro area relative to the US explain differences in output,
hours worked and labour productivity. They use the model to simulate the effect of
reducing the tax wedge from European to US levels and find an increase in output
and hours worked above 10%. Similarly, Poschke (2010), in a DSGE model with het-
erogeneous firms, finds that raising administrative entry costs from US to German
levels (c. 30% of GDP per capita) reduces the difference between US and German
TFP by about one third – a large impact. The reform reduces substitutability among
differentiated goods (i.e. competition is reduced) and so markups rise and the market
share of high productivity firms falls in general equilibrium. The calibrated model’s
performance is judged on whether it generates certain data features – a standard
matching approach that has been called ‘calibrationist’ (Canova 1994, Chapter 3).
Our empirical approach aligns us more closely with a growing macroeconomic lit-
erature concerned with estimating and formally evaluating DSGE models; see e.g.
Schorfheide (2011) and Ruge-Murcia (2014). In using indirect inference methods
and adopting the ‘directed’ Wald test (i.e. focusing the test on particular features of
most interest, rather than testing the model in every dimension), our approach fol-
lows Le et al. (2011) – similar approaches are Dridi et al. (2007), Guerron-Quintana
et al. (2017), and Hall et al. (2012).
3 Structural Model
As the backdrop for our investigation into the role of supply side policy in the growth
process, we use an open economy4 real business cycle model adapted from Meenagh
et al. (2010). It is a two-country model, with one country modeled after the UK
economy and the other representing the rest of the world; foreign prices and con-
sumption demand are treated as exogenous, and international markets are cleared
by the real exchange rate. The model omits many of the nominal and real frictions
we are used to seeing in the standard New Keynesian framework, while still captur-
ing UK real exchange rate movements (Meenagh et al. 2010). We are not alone in
observing that “modern DSGEmodels need not embed large batteries of frictions and
shocks to account for the salient features of postwar business cycles” (Ambler et al.
2012). Moreover, for an empirical analysis of the UK there is a clear advantage to
4The UK economy is highly open and an empirical study such as this must acknowledge that, though our
principal focus is the behaviour of output and TFP.
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abstracting from monetary policy which underwent numerous regime changes during
this sample period. To emphasise, this simple DSGE model is intended as a vehicle
within which to test empirically the central hypothesis about supply-side policy and
economic growth using Indirect Inference methods.
Productivity is non-stationary (Eq. 27) and depends on time spent in innovative
activity zt , the consumer’s choice (cf. Lucas 1990). This activity is subject to a
proportional cost due to government policy, τ ′t ; this policy variable is subject to tem-
porary but persistent shocks that generate long-lasting episodes of growth in TFP and
output around balanced growth behaviour, via its incentive effects on zt . In this paper,
zt is conceived of as entrepreneurship. A sizeable literature looks for a precise and
workable definition of this ‘activity.’ Here we follow the synthesis definition of Wen-
nekers and Thurik (1999), that entrepreneurship is the “ability and willingness [...] to
perceive and create new economic opportunities [...] and to introduce their ideas in
the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles [...] it implies participation
in the competitive process” (p. 46-47).5 We discuss the growth process in more detail
below.
3.1 Consumer Problem
The consumer chooses consumption (Ct ) and leisure (xt ) to maximise lifetime utility,
U :
U = maxE0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct , xt )
]
(1)
u(.) takes the form:
u(Ct,xt ) = θ0 1
(1 − ρ1)γtC
(1−ρ1)
t + (1 − θ0)
1
(1 − ρ2)ξtx
(1−ρ2)
t (2)
ρ1, ρ2 > 0 are coefficients of relative risk aversion; γt and ξt are preference shocks;
0 < θ0 < 1 is consumption preference. The agent divides time among three activities:
leisure, labour Nt supplied to the firm for real wage wt , and activity zt that is unpaid
at t but known to have important future returns. The time endowment is:
Nt + xt + zt = 1 (3)
Here the consumer chooses leisure, consumption, domestic and foreign bonds (b, bf )
and bonds issued by the firm to finance its capital investment (b˜), and new shares
(Sp) purchased at price q, subject to the real terms budget constraint.6
Ct + bt+1 + Qtbft+1 + qtSpt + b˜t+1 = wtNt − Tt + bt (1 + rt−1)
+ Qtbft (1 + rft−1) + (qt + dt )Spt−1 + (1 + rˆt−1)b˜t (4)
Taxbill Tt is defined further below. The only taxed choice variable in the model is zt ;
all other taxes are treated as lump sum to rule out wealth effects. Since the zt choice is
left aside until Section 3.4 on endogenous growth, the taxbill is not yet relevant.Qt =
5Otherwise, much of this description follows L. Minford and Meenagh (2019).
6Price Pt of consumption bundle is numeraire
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P
f
t
Pt
.Eˆt gives relative consumer prices. The nominal exchange rate Eˆt is assumed
fixed, so Qt is the relative import price. 7 Higher Qt implies a real depreciation of
domestic goods on world markets and hence an increase in competitiveness; this can
be thought of as a real exchange rate depreciation.
The consumer’s first order conditions yield the Euler Eq. (5), the intratemporal
condition (6),8 real uncovered interest parity (7 ), and the share price formula (8).
First order conditions on b˜t+1 and bt+1 combine for rˆt = rt . Indeed, returns on all
assets (Spt , bt+1, b˜t+1 and b
f
t+1) are equated.
1
(1 + rt )γtC
−ρ1
t = βEt [γt+1C−ρ1t+1 ] (5)
Ux
Uc
|U=0 = (1 − θ0)ξtx
−ρ2
t
θ0γtC
−ρ1
t
= wt (6)
(1 + rt ) = Et Qt+1
Qt
(1 + rft ) (7)
qt = qt+1 + dt+1
(1 + rt ) =
∞∑
i=1
dt+i
i−1∏
j=0
(1 + rt+j )
(8)
Equation 8 rests on the further assumption that qt does not grow faster than the
interest rate, limi→∞ qt+ii−1∏
j=0
(1+rt+j )
= 0.
The domestic country has a perfectly competitive final goods sector, producing a
version of the final good differentiated from the product of the (symmetric) foreign
industry. The model features a multi-level utility structure (cf. Feenstra et al. 2014).
The level of Ct chosen above must satisfy the expenditure constraint,
Ct = pdt Cdt + QtCft (9)
pdt ≡ P
d
t
Pt
. Cdt and C
f
t are chosen to maximise C˜t via the following utility function
(Eq. 10), subject to the constraint that C˜t  Ct .
C˜t = [ω(Cdt )−ρ + (1 − ω)ςt (Cft )−ρ]−
1
ρ (10)
At a maximum the constraint binds; 0 < ω < 1 denotes domestic preference bias.
Import demand is subject to a shock, ςt . The elasticity of substitution between domes-
tic and foreign varieties is constant at σ = 11+ρ . First order conditions imply the
relative demands for the imported and domestic goods:
C
f
t
Ct
=
(
(1 − ω)ςt
Qt
)σ
(11)
7b
f
t+1 is a real bond - it costs what a unit of the foreign consumption basket (C∗t ) would cost, i.e. P ∗t (the
foreign CPI). In domestic currency, this is P ∗t Eˆt . Assuming P ∗t  Pft (i.e. exported goods from the home
country have little impact on the larger foreign country) the unit cost of bft+1 is Qt .
8Later we show that the return on labour time, wt , is equal at the margin to the return on zt .
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Cdt
Ct
=
(
ω
pdt
)σ
(12)
Given Eq. 11 above, the symmetric equation for foreign demand for domestic goods
(exports) relative to general foreign consumption is
(Cdt )
∗ = C∗t
((
1 − ωF
)
ς∗t
)σF
(Q∗t )−σ
F
(13)
* signifies a foreign variable; ωF and σF are foreign equivalents to ω and σ . Q∗t is
the foreign equivalent of Qt , import prices relative to the CPI, and lnQ∗t  lnpdt −
lnQt .9 An expression for pdt as a function ofQt follows from the maximised Eq. 10:
1 = ωσ (pdt )ρσ + [(1 − ω)ςt ]σQρσt (14)
A first order Taylor expansion around pd  Q  ς  1, with σ = 1, yields a
loglinear approximation for this:
lnpdt = kˆ −
1 − ω
ω
1
ρ
ln ςt − 1 − ω
ω
lnQt (15)
The export demand equation is then
ln(Cdt )
∗ = cˇ + lnC∗t + σF
1
ω
lnQt + εex,t (16)
where cˇ collects constants and εex,t = σF [ln ς∗t + 1−ωω 1ρ ln ςt ]. Assuming no capital
controls, the real balance of payments constraint is satisfied.
b
f
t+1 = rft bft +
pdt EXt
Qt
− IMt (17)
3.2 Firm Problem
The representative firm produces the final good via a Cobb Douglas function with
constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal returns to labour and capital,
where At is total factor productivity:
Yt = AtK1−αt Nαt (18)
The firm undertakes investment, purchasing new capital via debt issue (b˜t+1) at t ; the
cost rˆt is payable at t + 1. Bonds are issued one for one with capital units demanded:
b˜t+1 = Kt . There are convex adjustment costs to capital. The cost of capital covers
the return demanded by debt-holders, capital depreciation δ and adjustment costs,
a˜t .10 The profit function is:
πt = Yt − b˜t+1(rˆt + δ + κt + a˜t ) − (w˜t + χt )Nt
9Q∗t = P
d
t
P ∗t
- since Qt = P
f
t
Pt
and Pt is numeraire, Qt = Pft . If domestic export prices hardly influence
the foreign CPI then P ∗t  Pft .
10The adjustment cost attached to b˜t+1 is: b˜t+1a˜t = b˜t+1. 12 ζ
(
b˜t+1 + b˜
2
t
b˜t+1
− 2b˜t
)
= 12 ζ(b˜t+1)2
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w˜t is the real unit cost of labour; κt and χt are cost shocks capturing random move-
ments in marginal tax rates. From the consumer first order conditions, rˆt = rt .
Substituting for this and for b˜t+1 = Kt , profits are:
πt = Yt − Kt(rt + δ + κt ) − 1
2
ζ(Kt)
2 − (w˜t + χt )Nt (19)
Here adjustment costs are explicit, having substituted b˜t+1a˜t = Kt a˜t = 12ζ(Kt)2.
Parameter ζ is constant.
The firm chooses Kt and Nt to maximise expected profits, taking rt and w˜t as
given. Assume free entry and a large number of firms operating under perfect com-
petition. The optimality condition for Kt equates the marginal product of capital (net
of adjustment costs and depreciation) to its price, plus cost shock – d is the firm’s
discount factor. Rearranged, this gives a non-linear difference equation in capital.
Kt = 1
1 + d Kt−1 +
d
1 + d EtKt+1 +
(1 − α)
ζ(1 + d)
Yt
Kt
− 1
ζ(1 + d)(rt + δ)−
1
ζ(1 + d)κt
(20)
Given capital demand, the firm’s investment, It , follows via the capital accumulation
identity.
Kt = It + (1 − δ)Kt−1 (21)
The optimal labour choice gives the firm’s labour demand condition:
Nt = α. Yt
w˜t + χt (22)
Internationally differentiated goods introduce a wedge between the consumer real
wage, wt , and the real labour cost for the firm, w˜t .11 The wedge is pdt = wtw˜t ,
implying, via 15, the following:
lnwt = kˆ + ln w˜t − 1 − ω
ω
lnQt − 1 − ω
ω
1
ρ
ln ςt (23)
3.3 Government
The government spends on the consumption good (Gt ) subject to its budget con-
straint.
Gt + bt (1 + rt−1) = Tt + bt+1 (24)
Spending is assumed to be non-productive (transfers). As well as raising tax revenues
Tt the government issues one-period bonds. Each period, revenues cover spending
and the current interest bill: Tt = Gt +rt−1bt so bt = bt+1. Revenue Tt is as follows.
Tt = τt zt + t (25)
τt is a proportional rate on time spent in innovative activity zt . Assuming that all
policy costs on zt are genuine external social costs redistributed to the consumer via
a reduction in the lumpsum levy t , tax revenue collected by government is equal
11The firm’s real cost of labour is the nominal wage Wt relative to domestic good price, Pdt , while the real
consumer wage is Wt relative to the general price Pt .
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to that taxbill paid by consumers.12 Lumpsum tax t captures revenue effects of
all other tax instruments, responding to changes in τt zt for revenue neutrality in the
government budget constraint. Government spending is modeled as an exogenous
trend stationary AR(1) process, where | ρg |< 1 and ηg,t is a white noise innovation.
lnGt = go + g1t + ρg lnGt−1 + ηg,t (26)
3.4 Productivity Growth
Productivity growth is a linear function of time spent in an activity zt , where a1 > 0:
At+1
At
= a0 + a1zt + ut (27)
Policy, τ ′t , drives growth systematically through zt .13 This section derives the lin-
ear relationship between productivity growth and τ ′t driving the model’s dynamic
behaviour in simulations. We adapt the endogenous growth process from Meenagh
et al. (2007) to a decentralised framework. It resembles Lucas (1990) in that the agent
can invest time in a growth-driving activity.14
The consumer chooses zt to maximise utility (Eqs. 1 and 2 ), subject to Eqs. 3,
4 and 25. Assume for the consumer’s shareholdings that Spt = S¯ = 1.15 The ratio-
nal agent expects zt to raise her consumption possibilities through her role as the
firm’s sole shareholder, knowing that, given Eq. 27, a marginal change in zt perma-
nently raises productivity from t + 1. This higher productivity is fully excludable
and donated to the atomistic firm she owns; higher productivity is anticipated to raise
household income via firm profits paid out as dividends, dt (everything leftover from
revenue after labour and capital costs are paid). The choice is thought not to affect
economy-wide aggregates; all prices are taken as parametric (note that the productiv-
ity increase is not expected to increase the consumer real wage here, though it does
so in general equilibrium - cf. Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2008)).16
Rearranging the first order condition with respect to zt (see Appendix A for full
derivation), the expression can be approximated as
At+1
At
= a1.
βργ
1−βργ .
Yt
Ct
wt
Ct
(1 + τ ′t )
(28)
12It is possible that only a proportion 0 < ψ < 1 of the penalty paid on zt enters the government
budget as revenue, the rest being deadweight loss that reduces the payoff to innovation without benefiting
the consumer in other ways. In that case revenue is T˜t = ψτt zt + t while the consumer tax bill is
Tt = τt zt + t . Here ψ is assumed to be 1, though notionally it could vary stochastically.
13All other factors - e.g. human capital or firm specific R&D investment - are in the error term.
14In Lucas’ model, human capital accumulation increases labour efficiency and future earnings. The trade-
off is between time spent in this productivity-enhancing activity and ordinary labour, which yields the
current wage immediately.
15This allows the substitution in the budget constraint that qtS
p
t − (qt + dt )Spt−1 = −dt .
16Given the time endowment 1 = Nt + xt + zt , the agent has indifference relations between zt and xt ,
between xt and Nt , and zt and Nt . The intratemporal condition in 6 gives the margin between xt and Nt ;
here we focus on the decision margin between zt and Nt , so the margin between zt and xt is implied.
Therefore the substitution Nt = 1 − xt − zt can be made in the budget constraint.
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This is in terms of τt
wt
≡ τ ′t , the ratio of τt to the wage (the opportunity cost of zt ). τ ′t
is a unit free rate unlike τt which, like the wage, is a rate per unit of time. A first order
Taylor expansion around τ ′t = τ ′ of Eq. 28 gives the following linear relationship:
d lnAt+1 = b0 + b1τ ′t + εA,t (29)
b1 = −a1.
βργ
1−βργ
Y
C
w
C
(1+τ ′)2 < 0 for a policy raising the costs of innovation.
17 At this
point, we revisit our conception of entrepreneurship which is admittedly broad.
Our entrepreneurship growth channel encompasses business activities which push
forward the production possibility frontier (the creative responder/destructor iden-
tified by Schumpeter (1947, 1942)) or raise the average productivity level in the
economy (the arbitrageur emphasized by Kirzner (1973)), perhaps by implement-
ing foreign technologies at home. There is no explicit entry or exit in this model,
and no international spillover. To reiterate, the share-holder entrepreneur donates
ideas resulting from zt to her firm, capturing the full return to zt , except for
taxes and regulatory costs. Non-rival technology – leading to costless spillovers –
and fixed innovating costs lead many to discard perfect competition as a viable
framework for examining innovation. However, Boldrin and Levine (2008, 2002)
argue against costless spillovers. Returns to technological progress generated by
the entrepreneur may accrue formally to fixed factors of production, rather than
appearing as supernormal profits; this is what happens in our model, while also the
individual entrepreneur/owner acts taking prices and costs as parametric. This model
provides a framework in which to test the hypothesis of interest: whether a causal
relationship from supply-side policy ‘barriers’ to economic growth exists in the UK
macroeconomic data. If a relationship from policy to growth is found, it is left to
future work to examine which process drives it by defining the microstructure more
minutely.
To close this section, we outline the implications of policy incentives for labour in
the model. Equations 28 and 27 relate zt to τ ′t . Define
∂zt
∂τ ′t
≡ c1, a constant parameter
featuring in the producer labour cost equation:
ln w˜t = const4 + ρ2 lnNt + ρ1 lnCt +
[
1 − ω
ω
]σ
lnQt + ρ22c1τ ′t + ew,t (30)
where ew,t = − ln γt + ln ξt + 1ρ
[
1−ω
ω
]σ
ln ςt .This equation is derived from the
intratemporal condition (Eq. 6 - see Appendix A for full derivation). τ ′t penalises zt ,
so c1 < 0, hence
d ln w˜t
dτ ′t
< 0 or d lnNt
dτ ′t
> 0. Equation 30 is the rearranged labour
supply condition; the worker responds to a higher penalty on zt by raising labour
time.18
17Other terms in the expansion are treated as part of the error term.
18Substituting into Eq. (28) from (27), rearranging for zt , then taking the derivative with respect to τ ′t , we
find c1 = −
βργ
1−βργ
Yt
C
ρ1
t
wt
C
ρ1
t
(1+τ ′t )2 ; we could potentially calibrate c1 from this, taking appropriate values for righthand
side variables. However there is flexibility around what values are ‘appropriate’. The same is true for b1.
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3.5 Closing theModel
Goods market clearing in volume terms is:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + EXt − IMt (31)
All asset markets also clear.
A transversality condition rules out balanced growth financed by insolvent bor-
rowing rather than growing fundamentals. The balance of payments is restricted so
that the long run change in net foreign assets (the capital account) is zero. At a
notional date T when the real exchange rate is constant, the cost of servicing the
current debt is met by an equivalent trade surplus.
r
f
T b
f
T = −
(
pdT .EXT
QT
− IMT
)
(32)
The numerical solution path is forced to be consistent with the constraints this condi-
tion places on the rational expectations. In practice it constrains household borrowing
since government solvency is ensured already, and firms do not borrow from abroad.
When solving the model, the balance of payments constraint is scaled by output so
that the terminal condition imposes that the ratio of debt to gdp must be constant in
the long run, bˆft+1 = 0 as t → ∞, where bˆft+1 =
b
f
t+1
Yt+1 . The model is loglinearised
before solution and simulation; the full model listing is in Appendix B.
3.6 Exogenous Variables
Stationary exogenous variables consist of shocks to real interest rates (Euler equa-
tion), labour demand, real wages, capital demand, export demand and import
demand. These are not directly observed but are implied as the difference between the
data and the model predictions (cf. the ‘wedges’ of Chari et al. (2007)). Those differ-
ences ei,t , which we call structural residuals or shocks, are treated as trend stationary
AR(1) processes:
ei,t = ai + bit + ρiei,t−1 + ηi,t (33)
ηi,t is an i.i.d mean zero innovation term; i identifies the shock. We model foreign
consumption demand, government consumption, foreign interest rates and policy
variable τ ′t similarly. AR(1) coefficients ρi are estimated. Where expectations enter,
they are estimated using a robust instrumental variable technique (Wickens 1982;
McCallum 1976); they are the one step ahead predictions from an estimated VECM.
We do not stationarise any of the endogenous variables and so the exogenous
shocks (wedges) extracted from each structural equation are either stationary, trend-
stationary, or non-stationary in the case of TFP. Where ai = 0 and bi = 0, the
detrended residual eˆi is used:
eˆi,t = ρi eˆi,t−1 + ηi,t (34)
eˆi,t = ei,t − aˆi − bˆi t (35)
The innovations ηi,t are approximated by the fitted residuals from estimation of
Eq. 34, ηˆi,t . The Solow residual lnAt is modelled as a unit root process with drift
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driven by a stationary AR(1) shock and by the detrended exogenous variable τ ′t ,
following Eq. 29.
lnAt = d + lnAt−1 + b1τ ′t−1 + eA,t (36)
eA,t = ρAeA,t−1 + ηA,t (37)
Deterministic trends are removed from exogenous variables since they enter the
model’s balanced growth path. We focus here on how the economy deviates from
steady state in response to shocks - in particular, stationary innovations to the policy
variable, τ ′t . Such innovations will have a permanent shift effect on the path of TFP
via its unit root. Due to their persistence they also generate transitional TFP growth
episodes above long-run trend. Note that, were τ ′t to be non-stationary, it would
cause simulated output to be I(2) which is not empirically defensible. We discuss this
treatment of τ ′ further in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.2 below.
4 Empirical Work
This empirical work is an application of the Indirect Inference testing method given
in Le et al. (2011). The method involves simulating the DSGE model by repeated
resampling of the shocks implied by the data, and then comparing the properties of
these model-generated simulations with the actual data. For that comparison we use
a theory-neutral descriptive model, the ‘auxiliary model,’ from which a formal test
statistic is derived. Our choice of auxiliary model and the method we apply, along
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with an exploration of its small sample properties, are discussed further below, though
we refer readers to the recent surveys in this journal for a more in-depth treatment
(Le et al. 2016; Meenagh et al. 2019).
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Macroeconomic Data for the UK
The sample is unfiltered UK macroeconomic data for 1970 to 2009; key series are
plotted in Fig. 1 (sources in Appendix). In this model, shocks to policy can have
long-lasting transitional effects on endogenous variables, and such shocks are occa-
sionally large. In both cases the HP filter distorts the estimates of underlying trends
(Hodrick and Prescott 1997); where we would want to analyse the model’s adjust-
ment to the policy shock, the HP filter may interpret it as a change in underlying
potential and remove it. For further discussion of the problems induced by filtering,
see e.g. Hamilton (2018). Given our non-stationary data, we choose a Vector Error
Correction Model as the auxiliary model - this is discussed further in Section 4.2.1
below. 19
4.1.2 Data for Policy Variable
For policy indicator τ ′t we collect UK data on regulation and tax, two key compo-
nents of the business environment. On regulation, the focus is on the labour market;
we use an index of centralized collective bargaining (CCB) produced by the World
Economic Forum and a mandated cost of hiring index (MCH) from the World Bank
Doing Business project; the latter reflects the costs of social security and other ben-
efits such as holiday pay. More detail is given in Appendix C.1. Taking the trade
union membership rate we interpolate the lower frequency indices using the Denton
proportionate variant adjustment method (Denton 1971). An equally weighted arith-
metic average of the resulting quarterly series for collective bargaining and mandated
hiring costs gives the labour market regulation (LMR) indicator used here to reflect
labour market inefficiency; see Fig. 2, Panel 1.20
In the absence of a good ‘effective’ entrepreneur tax rate for 1970-2009, which is
prohibitively complex to calculate, we use the top marginal income tax rate. This is
not to say that every entrepreneur gets into the top income tax bracket; the expected
return to entrepreneurship is generally small. This top marginal tax rate is a proxy for
19The model is solved using the Extended Path Algorithm similar to Fair and Taylor (1983), which ensures
that the one period ahead expectations are consistent with the model’s own predictions. Additionally,
the expectations satisfy terminal conditions which ensure that simulated paths for endogenous variables
converge to long run levels consistent with the model’s own long run implications. These long run levels
depend on the behaviour of the non-stationary driving variables (TFP and net foreign assets) as they evolve
stochastically over the simulation period (deterministic trend behaviour is removed).
20τ ′t excludes other types of regulation as data going back to 1970 is unavailable. However, the indices we
use are highly correlated with the OECD index of product market regulation - see Appendix for further
discussion.
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Fig. 2 Proxy indicators for policy barriers to entrepreneurship (Panel 2) and their components (Panel 1)
the profit motive central to the notion of entrepreneurship as we have defined it; cf.
Lee and Gordon (2005). See also e.g. Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2014) who find
that a reduction in marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution relative to
the marginal tax rate at average earnings increases entrepreneurship.
The top marginal income tax rate is measured annually; the series is interpolated
to a quarterly frequency by constant match. The series falls consistently until 2009
with the introduction of the 50p tax rate on income over $150,000 (Fig. 2, Panel 1).
The main policy indicator used in empirical work is an equally weighted average of
top marginal income tax and labour market regulation (Tau Series (1), Fig. 2 Panel
2). The SME rate of corporation tax may well belong in τ ′t ; reductions in this rate
lower the costs of running a new business. However, reducing corporation tax rel-
ative to other forms of taxation (employee or self-employed labour income) could
distort incentives to incorporate at the small end of the firm size distribution for
reasons unrelated to productivity growth. For instance, incorporation soared in the
UK after the 2002 Budget when the starting rate on corporate profits up to $10,000
was reduced to zero (Crawford and Freedman 2010). Corporation tax is therefore
excluded from the main τ ′t index. However, an alternative policy variable constructed
from the labour market indicator and corporation tax rates (in place of top marginal
income tax) is investigated in Section 4.4.1 (Tau Series (2), Fig. 2, Panel 2).
The index falls over the sample, irregularly due to steps in marginal income tax.21
In our model of productivity growth τ ′ is modelled exogenously as a stationary
stochastic series with high persistence, i.e. before solving the model a linear trend
term is estimated and removed, leaving the detrended τ ′t rate (see Section 3.6). We
can justify this in two ways. Either the trend in τ ′ is fully offset by other determinis-
tic factors affecting TFP in the long run, or (our preferred assumption) the trend that
we estimate in our sample is not a true long run trend. τ ′ could not continue indef-
initely along its sample trend, since this would imply tax/regulative levels going to
minus infinity. The policy variable is by definition bounded between 0 and 1, and
theoretically it should be stationary in the very long run. There are sound political
21KPSS and ADF test results support the decision to treat the series as trend stationary.
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economy arguments to say that such policies should be modelled as persistent AR(1)
series which stabilise around a long-run positive mean (hitting the zero lower bound
and staying there is politically infeasible for this variable).
An implication of this treatment is that the economy has a constant balanced
growth path along the lines of a standard neoclassical growth model, since the growth
of productivity is constant apart from the stationary shocks to τ ′ and the residual
error. The detrended series is plotted against the changes in the Solow residual (in
logs) in Fig. 3. This shows some significant movements around trend in the policy
variable and the interest is in whether such movements cause the behaviour of pro-
ductivity. Since our results may be sensitive to the choice of detrending procedure,
we conduct robustness tests on this in Section 4.4.1.
4.2 Indirect Inference Methods
See Le et al. (2016) for a full explanation of the methodology. Here we give a brief
overview. J bootstrap samples are generated from the DSGEmodel and some param-
eter set θ . Each sample is estimated using an auxiliary model, yielding coefficient
vectors aj for j = 1, .., J . Using the variance-covariance matrix  for the distri-
bution of aj implied by the structural model and θ, we construct the small-sample
distribution for the Wald statistic, WS(θ) = (aj − aj (θ))′W(θ)(aj − aj (θ)), where
aj (θ) is the mean of the J estimated vectors and W(θ) = ˆ(θ)−1. The same auxil-
iary model is estimated with the observed data, yielding vector αˆ. The test statistic is
then WS∗(θ) = (αˆ − aj (θ))′W(θ)(αˆ − aj (θ)) . A WS∗(θ) falling in the 95th per-
centile of the distribution or above implies a rejection of the structural model with θ at
5% significance. The Wald percentile can be converted into an equivalent t-statistic22
or p-value.
22Since the Wald is a chi-squared, the square root is asymptotically a normal variable.
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This Wald test procedure is the basis for estimation. Within a bounded parame-
ter space an algorithm searches for a parameter set, θ , which minimises the Wald
percentile for this structural model.
4.2.1 Auxiliary Model
The DSGE model solution can be written as a cointegrated VECM – we rearrange
and approximate this as a VARX(1); see Appendix. This approximation to the struc-
tural model’s reduced form is the unrestricted auxiliary model used in the indirect
inference Wald test (Eq. 38).
yt = [I − K]yt−1 + Kxt−1 + n + φt + qt (38)
t captures the deterministic trend in x¯t (the balanced growth behaviour of the exoge-
nous variables) affecting endogenous and exogenous variables (respectively yt and
xt ). Lagged difference regressors are in the error qt . Unit root variables, xt−1, control
for permanent effects of past shocks on x and y. Our research question is whether
tax and regulation play a causal role in determining TFP and output growth, so these
are initially the endogenous variables in the auxiliary VARX(1). This is therefore a
‘directed’ Wald test (Le et al. 2011). The policy variable τ ′t−1 and net foreign assets
b
f
t−1 are included as lagged exogenous variables; unit root variable b
f
t−1 captures the
model’s stochastic trend.23
Vector αˆ contains OLS estimates of the coefficients on observed data for these
lagged endogenous and exogenous variables plus the auxiliary model error variances.
The vector aj is composed similarly and used to construct the Wald distribution.
Auxiliary model errors are checked for stationarity. Though the trend term must
be present to capture deterministic behaviour, we focus on the stochastic behaviour
induced by the shocks and therefore exclude the deterministic trend from the test. We
expand on this further below.
4.2.2 Dealing with Balanced Growth Behaviour
The model’s balanced growth path is its deterministic behaviour in the absence of
stochastic shocks and with all long run conditions imposed. In the theoretical model,
the deterministic behaviour of each endogenous variable along the BGP is a combi-
nation of the true deterministic trends in the exogenous variables, including (indeed
principally) the exogenous trend in the I(1) TFP process. The deterministic trend
behaviour implied by the model’s long run solution can be calculated and added back
23Though this is a significant approximation to the full solution, it is still a demanding test of the model
which must match the joint behaviour of output and TFP, conditional on the non-stationary predetermined
variable bft−1 and on τ ′. Moreover, this level of approximation in the auxiliary model does not affect the
power of the test (see Section 4.3; or the small sample properties of Indirect Inference in general, see Le
et al. (2011) and Le et al. (2016)).
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into the simulated data, using the sample estimates for the exogenous variable trends
in place of the true trends.
In the actual data and also in our model-simulated samples with deterministic
behaviour added back in, there are both deterministic and stochastic trend compo-
nents in the endogenous variables. In the auxiliary VECM used as the descriptive
basis for the test, the combination of deterministic trends in the exogenous variables
would be captured by the deterministic trend term, while stochastic trends are cap-
tured by the non-stationary variables. As noted above, temporary shocks to τ ′ have a
permanent effect on I(1) productivity, which explains why τ ′ has such a large effect
on long run output (see Table 5).
However, though we allow for the deterministic trend in the VECM, in testing the
model we ignore its coefficient. We rely for the test on the ‘dynamic terms’ in the
VECM, relating output and productivity to each other. These provide high statistical
power as our Monte Carlo experiments show (see Section 4.3 below). Adding in the
trend terms from the model would diminish this power because there are many and
when combined would have a very large standard error, making it too easy for the
model to match the estimated output trend in the VECM.
Indeed, we would emphasise the well-understood point that these sample trends
do not necessarily apply in the long run. For example τ ′, as discussed above in
Section 4.1.2, cannot continue on a strong downward trend indefinitely without
absurd implications. Hence, another of the long-run conditions imposed when we
calculate the balanced growth path for the model is that these trends are not very long
run (population) trends. Effectively this means that the balanced growth behaviour of
our model is like any neoclassical exogenous growth model in that the deterministic
trend in TFP is exogenous; though in theory it would be affected by a deterministic
trend in τ ′, we assume that in the very long run the trend in τ ′ is zero.
4.3 Test Power andModel Identiﬁcation
4.3.1 Power Exercise for the Indirect Inference Wald Test
Since the Wald test is the basis for the estimation process, the results below and the
associated variance decomposition and simulated policy reform rely for their validity
on its power to reject misspecified models. In other macro-modelling applications
the test’s power has been found to be considerable; see Le et al. (2016). Here we
investigate the power of the test exactly as it has been applied here for this particular
model via a Monte Carlo exercise. Table 1 reports the rejection rates when the DSGE
model parameters are perturbed away from their true values (randomly up or down)
Table 1 Rejection rates, all coefficients falsified together
Falseness, θ (%) None 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50
Rejection rate(%) 5 5.66 5.76 6.44 9.10 29.48 99.30 100.00
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to an increasing extent.24 We find that structural coefficients 3% away from true are
rejected by the test 99.3% of the time, while 3.5% falseness leads to rejection 100%
of the time.
We would also like to know how often the test will reject a model when just a few
of the coefficients are misspecified. The coefficients of most interest here are b1 and
c1, since they determine the importance of the policy variable we have added into the
model. The power exercise is therefore repeated when these two coefficients alone are
falsified; we are particularly interested in picking up on falseness as the coefficient
gets closer to zero, so that we can be sure that policy is significant in the model. When
these two coefficients alone are 50% false (in the direction of zero), the model is
rejected 99.08% of the time. This provides a ‘worst case’ bound for our estimates of
these parameters; in practice it is unlikely that all other coefficients would have zero
misspecification.
4.3.2 Model Identiﬁcation
We also formally test the model’s identification using the numerical test developed
by Le et al. (2017), again using Monte Carlo methods. A true model is used to create
numerous large samples, and the identification test checks whether another param-
eter set can generate the same auxiliary model distribution as the true model, by
comparing the Indirect Inference Wald test rejection rates for true versus alternative
parameterisations. If some alternative model is rejected 5% of the time (i.e. at the
same rate as the true model) the model cannot be identified, as this occurs only when
the reduced form descriptions of true and alternative models are indistinguishable.
For a full explanation of the procedure, see Le et al. (2017).25
We find that structural parameters are rejected 100% of the time when 1% away
from true. When 0.7% away from the true set, alternative models are rejected 99.88%
of the time. These results on identification and test power give an idea of the
reliability of the method and of the estimation results which follow.
4.4 Estimation and Test Results
Table 2 presents structural coefficients that are held fixed throughout the analysis.
Long run ratios M
Y
, X
Y
, Y
C
and G
C
are set to UK post-war averages; these then imply
values for X
C
and M
C
. The rest are calibrated from Meenagh et al. (2010). Other
parameters in the DSGE model are estimated via the Indirect Inference procedure.
The estimates for this model, with τ(1) as the policy variable driving productivity,
are given in Table 3. The associated Wald percentile is 72, equivalent to a p-value
24For example, if coefficient ρ2 is 1.2 then inducing falseness by +3% means setting it at 1.236.
25The auxiliary model used for the test is a 5 variable VARX(4); the fuller auxiliary model is used in order
to be a closer approximation of the DSGE model’s solution.
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Table 2 Structural model parameters fixed throughout study
Labour share, α 0.7 K/C 0.196 Y/K 0.33
Discount factor, β 0.97 Y/C 1.732 X/Y 0.208
Depreciation rate, δ 0.0125 M/C,X/C,G/C 0.37,0.36,0.44 M/Y 0.213
of 0.28, well within the non-rejection area of the bootstrap distribution. The implied
AR(1) coefficients for the exogenous variables are reported in Table 4.26′27
A full set of impulse response functions was obtained for every shock in the model;
the model generates standard RBC behaviour with this parameter set. The estimated
import and export elasticities sum to 2.337, satisfying the Marshall-Lerner condi-
tion.28 They are also consistent with US estimates obtained by Feenstra et al. (2014),
and with UK estimates from Hooper et al. (2000). Given the long run constraint on
the capital equation that ζ3 = 1 − ζ1 − ζ2 , only ζ1 and ζ2 were estimated freely.
The estimated capital equation coefficients imply a strong pull of past capital on the
current value (0.636), indicating high adjustment costs, while the lower estimate of
the coefficient on expected capital, ζ2, at 0.335 implies a discount rate for the firm
far higher the consumer’s rate. This captures the effects of idiosyncratic risks faced
by the price-taking firm, e.g. the risk that the general price level will move once his
own price is set in his industry. We assume that idiosyncratic risks to the firm’s prof-
its cannot be insured and that managers are incentivised by these. We can also think
of there being a (constant) equity premium on shares – though this, being constant,
does not enter the simulation model. The impact of a policy shock at t on the change
in log productivity next quarter is estimated at −0.1209.
Given the estimates for θ we calculate a variance decomposition, bootstrapping the
model and calculating the variance in each simulated endogenous variable for each
shock, as reported in Table 5. This gives some insight into the historical data from
1970-2009 given the non-rejection of the model with θˆ . The policy variable plays a
significant part in generating variation in the level of all variables, particularly output,
consumption, labour supply (and hence the producer cost of labour w˜), exports and
the real exchange rate. It is also responsible for generating over 18% of the variation
in the quarterly growth rate of productivity. Therefore we can be sure this is distinct
from an exogenous growth model; policy has an important role in the dynamics. This
is because innovations in τ ′ enter TFP, an I(1) process, therefore having permanent
effects on the model and generating large variation in the endogenous variables. τ ′
also has a direct effect on labour supply via Eq. 30.
This model has passed an extremely powerful test in which only 3% falsity leads
to rejection in our Monte Carlo exercise. For a policymaker, as we have seen, this
implies a very low range of parameter uncertainty and so a high degree of policy
26Note that these AR(1) coefficients are high in many cases since we use unfiltered data when we extract
the structural residuals (wedges).
27The second row entry is the estimated persistence for eA, see Eq. 37. It is relatively low since TFP itself is
unit root and eA enters the first difference of TFP (Eq. 36). Thus it is closer to the AR parameter that would
be observed on the first differenced TFP series, were we to estimate At = d +b1τ ′t−1 +ρAt−1 +ηA,t .
28The current account balance improves when the real exchange rate depreciates.
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Table 3 Structural model parameters
Estimates
CRRA coefficient (Ct ) ρ1 0.971
CRRA coefficient (xt ) ρ2 1.520
Preference weight on Ct θ0 0.527
Home bias in consumption ω 0.543
Foreign equivalent of ω ωF 0.882
Import demand elasticity σ 0.768
Elasticity of substitution (Cd∗t , C
f ∗
t ) σ
F 0.852
Capital equation coefficients ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4 0.63,0.35,0.02,0.24
∂zt
∂τ ′t
c1 −0.056
∂[d lnAt+1]
∂τ ′t
b1 −0.121
Wald percentile 72.23
robustness. It also turns out that the estimated model can pass yet more powerful tests
– see Appendix, Table 11 – but this is essentially otiose, given the high robustness
achieved on the current test.
4.4.1 Robustness - Filtering Methods and Alternative Measures of τ ′
The policy variable has been made stationary by removing a linear trend, on the
basis that this removes the least information from the series. Removing a linear trend
leaves stochastic variation which turns out to be stationary. Here we check whether
the results reported above are sensitive to a change in the detrending method; we
use the widely used HP filter for this check. The two different trends are plotted
in Fig. 4. When the HP filtered τ(1) variable is used when testing the structural
Table 4 AR coefficients for structural residuals
Exogenous variable AR coefficient Estimated model
Shock to real interest rate ρr 0.871
Shock to T FP ρA 0.237
Shock to labour demand ρN 0.898
Shock to capital demand ρK 0.990
Shock to real wage ρw˜ 0.959
Shock to export demand ρX 0.959
Shock to import demand ρM 0.951
Shock to τ ρS 0.968
Shock to foreign consumption demand ρCF 0.918
Shock to foreign real interest rate ρrF 0.967
Shock to government consumption ρG 0.935
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Table 5 Variance Decomposition for estimated Tau(1) model. NFA: Net Foreign Assets. Q: inverse of real
exchange rate
r Y N Q NFA d(TFP)
Shock to r 0.1833 0.0016 0.0080 0.0114 0.0396 0
Shock to A 0.0453 0.1320 0.1056 0.1298 0.0087 0.8146
Shock to N 0.0150 0.0012 0.0111 0.0005 0.0008 0
Shock to K 0.1748 0.1515 0.1308 0.1055 0.0208 0
Shock to w 0.1314 0.0070 0.0786 0.0052 0.0004 0
Shock to X 0.0174 0.0044 0.0511 0.0653 0.5242 0
Shock to M 0.0034 0.0016 0.0180 0.0419 0.1642 0
Shock to τ ′ 0.2876 0.6997 0.5865 0.5970 0.1008 0.1854
CF Shock 0.0014 0.0006 0.0070 0.0195 0.0560 0
rF Shock 0.1377 0.0003 0.0027 0.0239 0.0843 0
G Shock 0.0027 0.00004 0.0006 0.00005 0.0002 0
model with the estimated coefficients reported in Table 3, we still find that the model
is not rejected. The test statistic falls in the 92nd percentile of the bootstrap Wald
distribution, equivalent to a p-value of 0.08.
When the τ ′ series is stationarised by HP filtering rather than extracting a lin-
ear trend, the resulting innovations are smaller because the two-sided filter removes
stochastic information. This explains the change in p-value for the test result. The
HP filter is a different and probably worse detrending treatment of the variable
(see Hamilton, 2018) which we report simply as a check on robustness to possible
detrending processes. As the model is still not rejected by quite a margin, it demon-
strates that the results we report do not stand or fall on the linear detrending method
used to stationarise the policy variable.
Fig. 4 Detrending methods for the policy variable
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Table 6 Key to policy variables
τ(1) Equally weighted average: LMR and top marginal tax rate on personal income
τ(2) Equally weighted average: LMR and small company tax rate on corporate profits
τ(3) LMR alone
The estimation and test results presented in Table 3 are for τ(1); see Fig. 2. Here
the results are checked for three measures of τ ′ (Table 6). Using theWald-minimising
coefficients found above, we tested the DSGE model using τ(2) for the policy data,
finding the test statistic still well inside the non-rejection region (the Wald percentile
is roughly 85). The same tests were carried out using τ(3); again, the model is not
rejected at 5% significance, (Wald percentile 94.41). These robustness checks show
that the model’s test performance is not overly sensitive to the weighting/composition
of the policy index; the conclusions do not stand or fall on one component of the
business environment versus another. The model passes the test for a policy driver
reflecting labour market flexibility alone, and when tax indicators are added. How-
ever, the inclusion of the top marginal income tax rate with its large step changes
yields a lower Wald percentile for the model and this policy component seems to
have had important effects.29
5 Growth Episode After a Policy Reform
Impulse response functions for a one-off 1 percentage point reduction in τ(1) illus-
trate the resulting growth episode, given the structural parameters in Table 3.30
Although the policy shock is temporary, it affects the level of productivity perma-
nently and shocks growth above its deterministic rate for a lengthy period (Fig. 5).31
The 1 percentage point τ(1) shock is gradually reversed over time, taking roughly ten
years to die away; on average this implies that the penalty is 0.5 percentage points
lower for 10 years. The log level of output is 1.6 percentage points higher than its
no-shock level after 18 years. This translates to an average higher growth rate of 0.09
percentage points per annum. The growth multiplier effect of an average 0.5 per-
centage point τ(1) reduction over ten years is therefore in the region of 0.17 for two
29Robustness was also carried out around the interpolation technique of τ(1). The conclusions are
unchanged when the Denton method is applied in levels rather than differences for the labour mar-
ket indicators. Where components are interpolated to quarterly frequency, robustness checks around the
interpolation technique show the conclusions are similarly unaffected (constant match interpolation was
checked against quadratic interpolation).
30In the exogenous τ ′ process, τ ′t = ρτ τ ′t−1 + ητ,t , innovation ητ,0 = 0.01 while ητ,t = 0 for t > 0. All
other ηi,t are set to zero for all t .
31Labour supply falls initially, as the lower opportunity cost of z makes labour relatively less attractive.
This causes output to fall at first, but as higher innovation in period 1 causes higher productivity next
period, output rises from t = 2. Over the simulation, real wages rise to offset the income effect on labour
supply from the productivity increase. Eventually Y and w converge to higher levels. Productivity growth
also triggers a real business cycle upswing, not illustrated.
Supply-side Policy and Economic Growth: A Case Study of the UK
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
10
x 10
-3 Y
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
A
0 10 20 30 40 50
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
T a u
Fig. 5 Impulse responses for one-off, 1 percentage point policy shock
decades. 32 Relating this to the UK data, Fig. 3 shows two large downward shocks
around trend, the first in 1979, the second in 1988; these correspond to the 1979
budget and the 1988 budget, both of which contained sharp personal income tax rate
cuts in the top band (from 0.83 to 0.6, and from 0.6 to 0.4 respectively). When the
deterministic trend is extracted, these shocks are far smaller. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to this model, such supply-side policy shocks would help to explain the observed
reversal of UK economic decline between 1980 and the 2000s.
In conjunction with the Directed Wald test results in Section 5.1, which show the
estimated model passes empirically as the explanatory process for productivity, out-
put and a range of other macroeconomic variables, the suggestion is that UK policy
over the sample period had substantial effects on economic growth and welfare.33
6 Conclusion
Weset up an identifiedmodel inwhich policy reform causes short- tomedium-run growth
episodes, and estimate its structural parameters by indirect inference, a method attracting
increasing attention in the macroeconomics literature and which is discussed further in
two recent surveys in this journal (Le et al. 2016; Meenagh et al. 2019). The simulated
features of this estimated model – summarised by an auxiliary model – were found
through an indirect inference Wald test to be formally close to the UK data features. We
interpret this as empirical evidence for the hypothesis that temporary movements in tax
and regulatory policy around trend drive short-run productivity growth in our UK sam-
ple (1970-2009). Since policy shocks in the model are exogenous and uncorrelated
with other shocks in the model, there is no ambiguity surrounding causation.
The tax and regulatory policy environment for this period is proxied by a weighted
combination of the top marginal rate of personal income tax and a labour market
regulation indicator. The estimation and test results suggest that these proxies for
32The episode is long-lasting because capital takes a long time to react fully to the rise in TFP, due to
adjustment costs.
33We use the utility function to calculate welfare implications of the reform, confirming these growth gains
are not achieved at the expense of welfare. However, the welfare function is basic so we do not emphasise
this exercise.
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‘barriers to entrepreneurship’ affected UK TFP growth negatively, consistent with
the argument of Crafts (2012), Card and Freeman (2004) and Acs et al. (2009).
The Monte Carlo results we report on the statistical power of the indirect inference
test as we apply it offer a sense of the robustness of these findings. The introduction
of 3.5% misspecification into our structural coefficients results in rejection by the
indirect inference test procedure 100% of the time. Even if only two of the structural
parameter estimates are misspecified (those two being the coefficients governing the
role of policy in the model), the test rejects with near certainty when those coeffi-
cients stray 50% below their true values: so for our parameter estimate of b1, the
one-period ahead impact of a one percentage point increase in the supply-side pol-
icy indicator, the estimate we obtain is -0.12 and this ‘worst-case’ power exercise
furnishes a lower bound for that estimate of -0.06.
We also subject the model to the identification test of Le et al. (2017) and conclude
that it is identified. The causal mechanism embedded in the DSGE model – from an
increase in labour market frictions and marginal tax rates to a decrease in productivity
growth – is integral to the model data generating process. Therefore if in fact (in
some alternative ‘true’ model) shocks to the tax and regulatory policy index increased
productivity growth rather than decreasing it, or had no perceptible effect, this model
would be rejected by the test.
The implication is that for policymakers to focus exclusively on knowledge cre-
ation policy (i.e. incentivising R&D) while ignoring incentives around entrepreneur-
ship would indeed be “seriously misguided” (Acs and Sanders 2013, p. 787). The
results indicate that the creation of an environment in which businesses operate flex-
ibly and innovatively played a supportive role in UK macroeconomic performance in
1970-2009; a less flexible environment would, based on these results, have led to a
relatively worse performance in this period.
When governments must spend without building up excessive debt, the temptation
is to increase marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution; this is also a nat-
ural response to increasing social inequality.34 The question of whether top marginal
tax rises come with an attached growth penalty is of some relevance when consider-
ing this policy option, though of course economic growth is just one consideration in
the pursuit of a social welfare optimum (albeit an important one). Our treatment of
the tax structure here has abstracted from key features. Next steps would be to look
at distributional effects within a heterogeneous agent framework (e.g. Coenen et al.
(2008)), and to look at how revenue is raised through various distortionary tax instru-
ments. This paper offers empirical evidence on the role of supply-side policy in past
UK growth at a highly aggregated level. Future work may, by introducing more com-
plexity into the model, look at interactions between tax policy, regulatory policy and
other macroeconomic policy interventions.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank anonymous referees and the Editor of this journal for
constructive suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.
34The UK government raised the top rate of income tax in 2009 from 40 to 50p, the first increase in this
band for over 20 years.
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Appendix A: Model Derivations, cont.
A.1 First order condition for z(t)
The first order condition for zt is:
dL
dzt
= 0 = −βtλtwt − βtλt τt + Et
∞∑
i=1
βt+iλt+i .
d dt+i
dzt
(39)
At the (Nt , zt ) margin, the optimal choice of zt trades off the impacts of a small
increase dzt on labour earnings (lower in period t due to reduced employment time),
subsidy payments (higher at t in proportion to the increase in zt ), and expected divi-
dend income. 35 With substitution from 27, the first order condition can be rearranged
as follows:
βtγtC
−ρ1
t wt =
a1
a0 + a1zt + ut .Et
∞∑
i=1
βt+iγt+iC−ρ1t+i Yt+i + βtλt st (41)
On the left hand side is the return on the marginal unit ofNt , the real consumer wage;
on the right is the present discounted value of the expected increase in the dividend
stream as a result of a marginal increase in zt , plus time t subsidy incentives attached
to R&D activity. 36 Substituting again from 27 for zt yields
At+1
At
= a1.
Et
∞∑
i=1
βiγt+iC−ρ1t+i Yt+i
γtC
−ρ1
t (wt + τ ′t )
(42)
35 dAt+i
dAt+i−1 =
At+i
At+i−1 . Hence for i ≥ 1,
d At+i
dzt
= d At+i
dAt+i−1
.
d At+i−1
dAt+i−2
.....
d At+2
dAt+1
.
d At+1
dzt
= At+i At
At+1
a1 (40)
so ddt+i
dzt
= Yt+i
At+i At+i
At
At+1 a1. It may be objected that dzt will enhance output directly through its effect on
productivity (holding inputs fixed), and will also induce the firm to hire more capital in order to exploit
its higher marginal product (similarly for labour). I assume that the effect of dzt on the future dividend
(dt+i = πt+i ) is simply its direct effect through higher TFP, on the basis that any effects on the firm’s
input demands are second order and can be ignored. Therefore the expected change in the dividend stream
is based on forecasts for choice variables (set on other first order conditions) that are assumed independent
of the agent’s own activities in context of price forecasts; she anticipates only the effect of zt on the level
of output that can be produced with given inputs from t + 1 onwards.
36The non-policy cost of generating new productivity via zt is assumed to be zero. The model abstracts
from a fixed or sunk cost of innovating. Moreover, time in zt leads in a certain fashion to higher
productivity, except in so far as the relationship is subject to a random shock.
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Modeling the preference shock to consumption, γt , as an AR(1) stationary process
such that γt = ργ γt−1 + ηγ,t , Setting ρ1  1, we approximate CtYt as a random walk,
so Et
Yt+i
Ct+i = YtCt for all i > 0.37 The expression becomes
At+1
At
= a1.
βργ
1−βργ .
Yt
Ct
wt
Ct
(1 + τ ′t )
(43)
where τt
wt
≡ τ ′t . A first order Taylor expansion of the righthand side of Eq. 28 around
a point where τ ′t = τ ′ gives a linear relationship between At+1At and τ ′t of the form
d lnAt+1 = b0 + b1τ ′t + εA,t (44)
where b1 = −a1.
βργ
1−βργ
Y
C
w
C
(1+τ ′)2 . Other terms in the expansion are treated as part of the
error term.
A.2 Deriving the labour supply response to policy shocks
Taking the total derivative of the time endowment in 3 gives dxt = −dNt − dzt ,
and hence dxt
xt
= −dNt−dzt
xt
. Assuming N¯ ≈ x¯ ≈ 12 in some initial steady state with
approximately no z activity implies
dxt
x¯
= d ln xt ≈ −d lnNt − dzt
N¯
= −d lnNt − 2dzt (45a)
Substituting into the loglinearised intratemporal condition for lnwt from 23 and
using 45a, we obtain
d lnNt + 2c1dτ ′t = − 1ρ2 d ln ξt + 1ρ2 d ln γt −
ρ1
ρ2
d lnCt+
1
ρ2
[
k + d ln w˜t − 1ρ
[
1−ω
ω
]σ
d ln ςt −
[
1−ω
ω
]σ
d lnQt }
] (45b)
Integrating this and rearranging for the log of the firm’s real unit cost of labour, ln w˜t ,
gives
ln w˜t = const4 + ρ2 lnNt + ρ1 lnCt +
[
1 − ω
ω
]σ
lnQt + ρ22c1τ ′t + ew,t (46)
where
ew,t = − ln γt + ln ξt + 1
ρ
[
1 − ω
ω
]σ
ln ςt (47)
Substituting into Eq. (28) from (27) and rearranging for zt , then taking the derivative
with respect to τ ′t , we find c1 = −
βργ
1−βργ
Yt
C
ρ1
t
wt
C
ρ1
t
(1+τ ′t )2 . We could potentially calibrate c1
from this, taking appropriate values for righthand side variables. However there is
flexibility around what values are appropriate in practice.
37Although in balanced growth C
Y
is constant, in the presence of shocks the ratio will move in an unpre-
dictable way (see Meenagh et al. 2007 for discussion). At any given point in the sample, the model is not
in balanced growth, though it tends to it in the future if no further shocks are expected.
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Appendix B: The Linearised System
The linearised system of optimality conditions and constraints solved numerically is
given below. Each equation is normalised on one of the endogenous variables (con-
stants are suppressed in the errors). Variables are in natural logs except where already
expressed in percentages. For clarity, ln(Cdt )
∗ and lnCft are denoted lnEXt and
ln IMt .
rt = ρ1 (Et lnCt+1 − lnCt) + er,t (48)
lnYt = α lnNt + (1 − α) lnKt + lnAt (49)
lnNt = lnYt − w˜t + en,t (50)
lnKt = ζ1 lnKt−1 + ζ2 lnKt+1 + ζ3 lnYt − ζ4rt + ek,t (51)
lnCt = Y¯
C¯
lnYt − EX
C¯
lnEXt + IM
C¯
ln IMt − K¯
C¯
lnKt (52)
+ (1 − δ − γk) K¯
C¯
lnKt−1 − G¯
C¯
lnGt
ln w˜t = ρ2 lnNt + ρ1 lnCt +
[
1 − ω
ω
]σ
lnQt + ρ22c1τ ′t + ewh,t (53)
lnwt = ln w˜t −
[
1 − ω
ω
]σ
lnQt + ew,t (54)
lnEXt = lnC∗t + σF
1
ω
lnQt + eX,t (55)
ln IMt = lnCt − σ lnQt + eM,t (56)
lnQt = Et lnQt+1 + rft − rt (57)
bˆ
f
t+1 =
b˜f
1 + g r
f
t +
r˜f
1 + g bˆ
f
t +
(
1
1 + g
)( EX
Y˜
lnEXt − EX
Y˜
1
ω
lnQt
− IM
Y˜
ln IMt
)
(58)
lnAt = lnAt−1 + b1τ ′t−1 + eA,t (59)
lnC∗t = ρC∗ lnC∗t−1 + ηC∗,t (60)
lnGt = ρG lnGt−1 + ηG,t (61)
r
f
t = ρrf rft−1 + ηrf,t (62)
τ ′t = ρτ τ ′t−1 + ητ,t (63)
Appendix C: Data Appendix
Table 7 contains all definitions and sources of data used in the study, as well as a
symbol key. Most UK data are sourced from the UK Office of National Statistics
(ONS); others from International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank of England (BoE),
UK Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Labour Market Indicators are taken from the Fraser Insti-
tute Economic Freedom Project, which sources them from the World Economic
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Table 7 Data description
Symbol Variable Definition and description Source
Y Output Gross domestic product; constant prices. ONS
N Labour Ratio of total employment to 16+
working population1
ONS
K Capital stock Calculated from investment data (I) using Eq. 21 (na)
I Investment Gross fixed capital formation +
changes in inventories
ONS
C Consumption Household final consumption
expenditure by households
ONS
A Total factor productivity Calculated as the Solow Residual in Eq. 18 (na)
G Government consumption General government, final consumption expenditure ONS
IM Imports UK imports of goods and services ONS
EX Exports UK exports of goods and services ONS
Q Terms of trade Calculated from E.PF
P
(na)
E Exchange rate Inverse of Sterling effective exchange rate ONS
PF Foreign price level Weighted av. of CPI in US (0.6),
Germany (0.19) & Japan (0.21)
IMF
P Domestic general price level Ratio, nominal to real consumption ONS
bF Net foreign assets Ratio of nominal net foreign assets
(NFA) to nominal GDP 2
ONS
w Consumer real wage Average earnings index 3 divided by Pt ONS
w˜ Unit cost of labour Average earnings index 3 divided
by GDP deflator
ONS
r Real interest rate, domestic Nominal interest rate minus one
period ahead inflation.
(na)
R Nominal interest rate, domestic UK 3 month treasury bill yield BoE
rF Real interest rate, foreign RF minus one-period ahead infla-
tion (year-on-year change in PF )
(na)
RF Nominal interest rate, foreign Weighted av., 3-month discount
rates, US, Germany & Japan 4
IMF
CF Foreign consumption demand World exports in goods and services IMF
τ(1) Tax & regulatory environment Equally weighted av., LMR and top
marginal income tax
HMRC
τ(2) Tax & regulatory environment Equally weighted av., LMR and
corporation tax (SME rate)
HMRC
τ(3) Labour market regulation(LMR) Equally weighted av., CCB and
MCH (interpolated using TUM)
Various
T UM Trade union membership rate Trade union membership over
working pop (16+).
ONS
CCB Centralized collective bargaining Survey-based indicator of strength
of collective bargaining
GCR
MCH Marginal cost of hiring index Doing business oroject indicator WB
1Working population is total claimant count plus total workforce jobs
2Nominal NFA is accumulated current account surpluses ( $m), taking the Balance of Payments
international investment position as a starting point
3AEI for whole economy including bonuses
4Weights as PF . Germany proxies EU
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Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) and the World Bank (WB). All data
seasonally adjusted and in constant prices unless specified otherwise.
C.1 Data for Policy Indicator
UK data on τ ′t reflects regulation and tax. On regulation, the focus (due to data range
and availability) is on the labour market. Two components are selected from the
labour market sub-section of the Economic Freedom (EF) indicators compiled by the
Fraser Institute: the Centralized Collective Bargaining (CCB) index and Mandated
Cost of Hiring (MCH) index. Of the labour market measures, these two components
span the longest time-frame.
The original data source for CCB is World Economic Forum’s Global Competi-
tiveness Report (various issues). Survey participants answer the following question:
“Wages in your country are set by a centralized bargaining process (= 1) or up to
each individual company (= 7)”. The Fraser Institute converts these scores onto a
[0,10] interval. MCH is constructed from World Bank Doing Business data, reflect-
ing “the cost of all social security and payroll taxes and the cost of other mandated
benefits including those for retirement, sickness, health care, maternity leave, fam-
ily allowance, and paid vacations and holidays associated with hiring an employee”
(Fraser Institute 2009). These costs are also converted to a [0,10] interval; zero rep-
resents a hiring process with high regulatory burden.38 Labour market flexibility
increases with both indices in their raw form. These [0,10] scores are scaled to a [0,1]
interval before being interpolated as follows.
UK trade union membership (TUM) data is available annually from the late 1800s.
TUM data for 1970 to 2009 is made quarterly by quadratic three-point interpolation
(estimated values average to annual values), then divided by total employment (16+)
to give a quarterly union membership rate on a [0,1] scale. This is inverted and used
to interpolate both the CCB and MCH series via the Denton proportionate variant
adjustment method (Denton 1971). The unionisation rate is used to interpolate CCB
and MCH on theoretical grounds; we expect union membership to be greater when
bargaining power of unions is higher. Equally, increased protection of worker ben-
efits should be correlated with a strong worker voice represented by unions.39 The
correlations in the data bear this out (Table 8).
The resulting quarterly series for CCB and MCH incorporate information from the
unionisation rate.40 The interpolated series are inverted to represent a penalty rate; a
higher value indicates a more hostile business environment. They are plotted in Fig. 6
38“The formula used to calculate the zero-to-10 ratings was: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - Vmin) multiplied by
10. Vi represents the hiring cost (measured as a percentage of salary). The values for Vmax and Vmin were
set at 33% (1.5 standard deviations above average) and 0%, respectively. Countries with values outside of
the Vmax and Vmin range received ratings of either zero or 10, accordingly”. Fraser Institute (2009).
39Alternative theories predict a negative correlation between MCH and union membership (the idea that
unions are only needed when the government fails to represent workers’ interests directly) but the data
indicate a positive correlation.
40The interpolation is carried out for both level and first differences of y/x, where y is the low frequency
series and x the higher frequency series (the union membership rate); the resulting series are very similar
but first differences are smoother. We use the first difference output.
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Table 8 Correlations: Fraser Institute Labour Market Indicators CCB and MCH, and Trade Union
Membership rate, inverted (TUM inv)
CCB MCH
MCH 0.797 1.000
TUM (inv) 0.899 0.764
Fig. 6 Inverted Fraser Institute indices. Left panel: Centralized Collective Bargaining (CCB) score;
original points and interpolated series. Right panel: Marginal Cost of Hiring (MCH).
Table 9 Correlations: OECD product market regulation indicator (Network Industries), Fraser Institute
indicators (CCB and MCH), and trade union membership
PMR(inv)
CCB 0.947
MCH 0.800
TUM(inv) 0.962
against the scatter of low frequency data points (scaled to [0,1] and inverted). Neither
interpolated series strays far from the original score.
The interpolated, inverted CCB andMCH indicators are equally weighted together
to give the ‘Labour Market Regulation’ indicator (LMR) of labour market ineffi-
ciency (Fig. 2).41 Other types of regulation are not incorporated into τ ′t in this study,
since measures spanning the sample period are largely unavailable. However, the
high positive correlation between the Fraser Institute CCB and MCH measures and
the OECD indicator of Product Market Regulation is interesting (Table 9). The LMR
indicator may not be a bad proxy for product market entry regulation in the UK.
41A fuller measure would reflect employment protection legislation including firing costs (see e.g. Botero
et al. 2004), but data availability is a constraint. Correlations of our LMR indicators with (highly time-
invariant) OECD EPL measures from 1985 for the UK are actually negative; our indicators do not fully
capture the increases in dismissal regulation over the period and thus may slightly overstate the extent
to which the UK labour market is ‘deregulated’; however, the strong decline of collective bargaining and
union power over the period represents the removal of significant labour market friction.
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The second part of the index for τ ′t reflects the tax environment. The top marginal
income tax rate is used for τ(1) (see main text).
Appendix D: Auxiliary Model
The full linearised structural model, comprising a p x 1 vector of endogenous vari-
ables yt , a r x 1 vector of expected future endogenous variables Etyt+1, a q x 1
vector of non-stationary variables xt and a vector of i.i.d. errors et , can be written in
the general form
A(L)yt = BEtyt+1 + C(L)xt + D(L)et (64)
xt = a(L)xt−1 + d + b(L)zt−1 + c(L)t (65)
xt is a vector of unit root processes, elements of which may have a systematic
dependency on the lag of zt , itself a stationary exogenous variable (this variable is
subsumed into the shock below). t is an i.i.d., zero mean error vector. All polynomi-
als in the lag operator have roots outside the unit circle. Since yt is linearly dependent
on xt it is also non-stationary. The general solution to this system is of the form
yt = G(L)yt−1 + H(L)xt + f + M(L)et + N(L)t (66)
Table 10 Correlation coefficients for tax and regulatory components of composite index. Correlations
are with the inverted, interpolated Fraser index scores for CCB and MCH (higher score indicates higher
regulation)
CCB MCH
Top marginal income tax rates 0.786 0.623
Corporate tax (SME rate) 0.868 0.700
Table 11 Indirect Inference test results for auxiliary VARX(1), various endogenous variables
Auxiliary model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Endogenous Y, A Y, A, r Y, A, Q Y, A, K Y, A, N
Wald percentile 72.23 82.37 90.16 92.93 94.41
Auxiliary model (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Endogenous Y, A, C Y, A, N, C Y, A, r, Q Y, A, r, K Y, A, r, N
Wald percentile 95.05 94.04 89.47 94.80 94.92
Auxiliary model (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Endogenous Y, A, X Y, A, M Y, A, M, X Y, A, K, C Y, A, Q, N
Wald percentile 96.12 86.40 98.71 94.26 95.12
Auxiliary model (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Endogenous Y, A, M, Q Y,A,M,Q,r Y, A, C, M Y, A, w Y, A, w˜
Wald percentile 93.38 95.25 99.1 97.28 98.60
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where f is a vector of constants. Under the null hypothesis of the model, the equil-
brium solution for the endogenous variables is the set of cointegrating relationships
(where  is p x p )42:
yt = [I − G(1)]−1[H(1)xt + f ] (67)
= xt + g (68)
though in the short run yt is also a function of deviations from this equilbrium (the
error correction term ηt ):
yt − (xt + g) = ηt (69)
In the long run, the level of the endogenous variables is a function of the level of the
unit root variables, which are in turn functions of all past shocks.
y¯t = x¯t + g (70)
x¯t = [1 − a(1)]−1[dt + c(1)ξt ] (71)
ξt = t−1s=0εt−s (72)
Hence the long-run behaviour of x¯t can be decomposed into a deterministic trend
part x¯Dt = [1 − a(1)]−1dt and a stochastic part x¯St = [1 − a(1)]−1c(1)ξt , and the
long run behaviour of the endogenous variables is dependent on both parts. Hence
the endogenous variables consist of this trend and of deviations from it; one could
therefore write the solution as this trend plus a VARMA in deviations from it. An
alternative formulation is as a cointegrated VECM with a mixed moving average
error term
yt = −[I − G(1)](yt−1 − xt−1) + P(L)yt−1 + Q(L)xt + f + ωt (73)
ωt = M(L)et + N(L)εt (74)
which can be approximated as
yt = −K[yt−1 − xt−1] + R(L)yt−1 + S(L)xt + h + ζt (75)
or equivalently, since y¯t−1 − x¯t−1 − g = 0,
yt = −K[(yt−1−y¯t−1)−(xt−1−x¯t−1)]+R(L)yt−1+S(L)xt +m+ζt (76)
considering ζt to be i.i.d. with zero mean. Rewriting Eq. 75 as a levels VARX(1) we
get
yt = [I − K]yt−1 + Kxt−1 + n + φt + qt (77)
where the error qt now contains the suppressed lagged difference regressors, and the
time trend is included to pick up the deterministic trend in x¯t which affects both the
endogenous and exogenous variables. xt−1 contains unit root variables which must
be present to control for the impact of past shocks on the long run path of both x and
y. This VARX(1) approximation to the reduced form of the model is the basis for the
unrestricted auxiliary model used throughout the estimation.
42In fact the matrix  is found when we solve for the terminal conditions on the model, which constrain
the expectations to be consistent with the structural model’s long run equilibrium.
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